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Abstract
This study offers evidence concerning the announcement effect of equity private placements by examining the stock
market reaction to the announcements made by Malaysian firms for the period 1999 to 2007. This study is motivated
by empirical findings that unlike public placements, private placements are associated with positive announcement
effect. Two prominent hypotheses used to explain the positive market responses are information and monitoring
hypotheses. However, inconsistent with previous studies, we find zero announcement effect for Malaysian market.
The result suggests that equity private placement in Malaysia does not convey positive signal as it does in other
countries.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines the announcement effect of firms which conduct equity private placements for the period
1999 to 2007 in Malaysia. Private placement refers to the sale of shares directly to a restricted number of current or
new investors. As suggested by its name, the transactions are done privately rather than publicly where the buyers can
have direct negotiations with the issuer. Private placement is a good alternative for firms that do not want to go
through the hassle of issuing other methods of raising capital such as rights issue. It usually requires less regulatory
compliance and takes less time to complete.
It is reported by Bank Negara that raising capital via private placement had increased tremendously from
RM17.7 million in 1970 to RM838 million in 2004. In 1994, a total of RM7821 million of funds was raised through
private placement of shares as a result of more flexible submission requirements of application introduced by
Securities Commission (SC). This amount represents for about nine percent of the new issues of shares. Due to the
less stringent submission requirements, more firms are attracted to raise funds via private placement because it is
faster to implement. For comparison, to issue rights firms need to get the shareholders’ approval before the issuance
can be made but to issue private placements they do not need to get the shareholders’ approval. Prior approval from
the shareholders is usually obtained during the Annual General Meeting (AGM) which allows the firms to issue up to
10 percent of the issued and paid-up capital. On top of that, there is no rule imposed on when another issue can be
made after the last issue. In general, an application should provide key information such as the background
information of the applicant firm; historical financial performance; pricing methodology; proposed utilization of
proceeds; amount of securities to be issued; underwriting commitment; and the identity of the persons to whom the
securities will be placed.
Previous studies document significant positive abnormal returns surrounding the private placements
announcements (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Hertzel and Rees, 1998; Ferreira
and Brooks, 1999; Goh et al., 1999; Hertzel et al., 2002; Tan, Chng and Tong, 2002; Brooks and Graham, 2005;
Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). The results contradict the results of public equity issues
which are associated with negative announcement effects (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hertzel and Smith (1993),
attribute the positive market reaction to the release of favorable information about the firm’s true value. They claim
that private placement can be used to reduce underinvestment problem illustrated by Myers and Majluf (1984).
Managers always act in the best interest of current shareholders. Assuming that information asymmetry exists
between the managers and potential investors, a firm will choose to issue common stock when it is overvalued.
Consequently, firms without financial slack often forgo positive net present value investment projects in order to
avoid issuing new shares as it conveys a negative signal to the market. Private placement investors are usually
individuals and institutions that have enormous capacity and resources to assess the firm’s true value. The willingness
of the investors to buy the shares sends a signal to the outside investors that the shares have been priced at a fair
value. Indirectly, private placements investors offer quality certification from which the market infers favorable
information about the firm’s prospects. Earlier, Wruck (1989), investigates the announcement effects of private
placements from 1979 to 1985. She finds positive announcement period abnormal returns of 4.4 percent and claims
the positive effect is due to change in ownership concentration. Ownership concentration leads to an increase in
monitoring which subsequently reduces the agency cost. Both the information hypothesis and monitoring hypothesis
have been widely used to explain the positive phenomenon.
This study is motivated in part by the lack of research on private equity offerings in Malaysia. Most of the
previous studies were carried out in the United States (see for example, Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993;
Hertzel and Rees, 1998; Ferreira and Brooks, 1999; Goh et al., 1999; Hertzel et al., 2002); and they showed
consistently significant positive announcement effect. Other studies carried out in Japan, Singapore, Sweden and New
Zealand (see for example Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Tan, Chng and Tong, 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005;
Anderson, 2006) also yielded the same result. The effect might not be the same for Malaysian market, for Malaysian
firms are governed by different regulations and surrounded by different factors that could influence the investors’
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reaction to the announcements. For instance, in the United States no restriction is imposed on the maximum number
of shares to be issued. On the contrary, equity private placements issued in Malaysia must not exceed 10 percent of
the firm’s issued and paid-up capital. In addition, securities placed with any single investor must not exceed 20
percent of the total placement. In the event the total placement size exceeds 10 percent or the placement shares placed
to one placee exceed 20 percent of the total placement shares, the affected placees are restricted from selling their
securities within six months from the date of listing. Since such regulations limit the number of shares per placee, the
impact and effectiveness of private placements as a monitoring mechanism through ownership concentration as has
been illustrated by Wruck (1989) is doubtful. Malaysian investors might not perceive announcements of private
placements as good news, thus will not react positively as reported in the earlier studies. This is because with only
two percent of shares, the purchasers will not be able to provide the monitoring benefit which leads to agency cost
reduction. Instead, private placements might promote managerial entrenchment by diluting the ownership
concentration.
As expected, the announcements of equity private placements in Malaysia do not result in the same positive
effect on stock prices as they do in other countries. For a sample of 209 private placement announcements from 1999
to 2007, we find non-statistically significant announcement period returns. The three-day cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) is 0.37 percent, yet it is not statistically significantly different from zero.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature review on the announcement
effect of private placement. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology used. Section 4 presents the findings, and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous studies on private placements show that private issues are associated with positive announcement effects.
For example, Wruck (1989) finds positive announcement period abnormal returns of 4.4 percent, and Hertzel and
Smith (1993) report abnormal returns of 1.7 percent for 106 firms from 1980 to 1987. Similar results are reported by
Kato and Schallheim (1993). A significant 5 percent of abnormal returns are observed around the announcement of
private placements in Japan. Other studies that show positive announcement period returns include studies by Hertzel
et al. (2002), Hertzel and Rees (1998), Goh et al. (1999), and Ferreira and Brooks (1999). They report statistically
significantly abnormal returns of 2.4 percent, 1.3 percent, 2.4 percent and 3.0 percent respectively. All of these studies
investigate the impact of share prices surrounding the announcement of private placements in the United Sates. Also
in the United States, Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) report positive announcement returns of 2.2 percent for 397 firms
placing equity privately from 1983 to 1992; and Brooks and Graham (2005) report abnormal returns of 2.5 percent.
Similar results are also revealed by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) who find positive three-day cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) of 7.3 percent for Swedish public firms. Tan, Chng and Tong (2002), report positive announcement
effects of private placements issued in Singapore for the period 1987 to 1996; where the abnormal returns are
positively related to the placement price. Nevertheless, the announcement return is not significant on the
announcement date. They report a significant positive 21-day average holding period return (AHPAR) of 6.27
percent.
One of the major hypotheses used to explain the positive announcement effect of private placements is the
monitoring hypothesis. As a matter of fact, monitoring, agency cost, and managerial entrenchment are three closely
related theories that have been used in explaining the impact of private placements on stock price reactions. Extant
literature demonstrates private placements can be employed to reduce agency cost. This is because private placement
investors are usually well informed. Hence, they may provide expert advice and efficient monitoring. Consequently,
the firm’s value might increase as reflected by the positive market reaction to private placement announcements. Yet,
private placements may also lead to decrease in firm’s value by increasing agency problems through managerial
entrenchment.
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Wruck (1989) argues private placements help to enhance a firm’s value by increasing ownership
concentration. This ownership concentration then leads to reduction in agency costs as a result of increased in
monitoring provided by the private placement investors. Ownership concentration is defined as percentage holdings
of the largest shareholders who include: (i) managers, (ii) directors and (iii) 5 percent or greater beneficial owners.
Results of the study show that the relationship only holds when the ownership concentration is at a low (0 to 5
percent) or high level (more than 25 percent), but shows opposite direction at middle concentration level (5 to 25
percent). Empirical findings provide evidence that ownership concentration may increase firm’s value only if it
increases monitoring of management or serves to align managers and shareholders interest. Nevertheless, change in
ownership concentration may also decrease the firm’s value if it promotes managerial entrenchment instead of
reducing agency cost problem. Hertzel and Smith (1993) support findings by Wruck (1989) that private placements
serve as a monitoring mechanism for the issuing firms as long as the management team is not part of the investors.
Correspondingly, Ferreira and Brooks (1999) find fraction of shares placed is positively related to abnormal returns.
Measured by the number of shares issued divided by total shares outstanding; they conclude larger fraction means
higher ownership concentration. Thus, it supports the view that private placements increase monitoring.
Monitoring hypothesis might be one of the main motives for firms to place equity privately. However,
managerial entrenchment could also be another possible motive for firms to do so. Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan
(2007), for example, argue private placements are often made to passive investors, thus strengthening management
control of the issuing firm. They provide evidence which shows that 83 percent of the private placements purchasers
are passive investors. Only 12 percent of them are active and the other 5 percent are managerial investors. This view
contradicts Wruck (1989) who states private placements are made to active investors who actively monitor the use of
corporate resources. Likewise, a study by Wu (2004) finds private placement investors do not engage in more
monitoring activities than public offering investors. A study by Tan, Chng and Tong (2002) reveals no statistically
significant relation between change in the level of ownership concentration and the abnormal returns surrounding the
announcement of private placements in Singapore.
Hertzel and Smith (1993); Hertzel and Rees (1998); and Goh et al. (1999) attribute the positive market
reaction to the release of favorable information about firm’s true value. Asymmetric information refers to a situation
where one party has superior information over the other party. As a result, the one with superior information can take
advantage of the other party. It is a common view that information asymmetry exists between management of a firm
and potential investors regarding the true value of the firm. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), if managers act in
the interest of current shareholders, then a firm that issues equity publicly to new shareholders conveys management’s
belief that the firm is overvalued. This is due to the perception that managers have better information about firm’s
value. For that reason, to avoid such negative perception managers of undervalued firms with profitable investment
opportunities but lacking financial slack are reluctant to issue new equity. Ritter (1991) argues that managers tend to
time the stock issuance when the stocks are overvalued to take advantage of a window of opportunity.
Private placement offers an alternative solution to the information asymmetry problem. It can be achieved
because private placement investors are usually individuals and institutions that have enormous capacity and
resources to asses the firm true value. In addition, since private placements are placed to a small number of investors,
there is a possibility that the investors can assess the firm true value through negotiations with the management. A
study by Hertzel and Smith (1993) provides empirical evidence that supports the belief that private placements can
mitigate the underinvestment problem proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Findings of the study reveal that the
positive announcement effect for private placements is partly explained by the information asymmetry hypothesis.
The willingness of the private placement investors to purchase the shares conveys to the market that the stock is
undervalued and private placement discounts reflect costs by those investors in acquiring information about the firm’s
value. According to Hertzel and Rees (1998), the firm’s earnings increase significantly following the equity issuance
and the earnings changes are positively correlated with announcement returns. Similarly, Goh et al. (1999) find
positive relationship between announcement period abnormal returns and analysts upward revisions of earnings
forecasts.  Brooks and Graham (2005) argue that smaller firms with less financial slack earn positive announcement
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period return due to the enhancement of firms’ liquid assets. They conjecture the results are caused by the willingness
of private placement investors to provide additional liquidity to the firms. Given the assumption that these investors
have greater knowledge of inside information, market reacts positively to the announcement.
Ferreira and Brooks (1999) conclude the positive announcement effect is due to investors’ expectations that
the firms’ performance will improve in the future. This is consistent with the result of the study that shows significant
positive abnormal returns for firms which subsequently go out of business. In the same way, Hertzel et al. (2002)
suggest the announcement effect is due to the investors’ overoptimism at the time the announcements are made. They
find that private equity offerings follow periods of relatively poor operating performance and investors are over
confident that private placements will improve the firm’s current operating performance. Likewise, Anderson (2006)
reports prior to the private placement announcements the issuing firms exhibit negative earnings and excessive values
of book-to-market equity ratio.
In conclusion, nearly all studies show firms that issue private placements experience positive announcement
effects. Regardless of the place and the period under study, the studies yield similar results; with monitoring effects
and information effects seem to partly offer some explanation of the positive effects.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
Tests are conducted using a sample of announcements from 1999 to 2007. Sample is gathered by identifying
announcements of the equity private placements from Bursa Malaysia’s website. The event date is identified by the
first official announcement made by the issuing firms. In this case, the event date is the date when the news is
officially released by Bursa Malaysia2 in its official website in the “announcement” section. Announcements by
finance and finance-related firms are excluded because they have different statutory requirements. Daily share prices
and market index prices are collected from the DataStream database. We first gathered 308 announcements made by
firms listed on main board and second board3 of Bursa Malaysia. However, to avoid confounding effects, only
“clean” announcements are taken into consideration, which means announcements of private placements with other
contemporaneous announcements are excluded. This procedure resulted in a sample of 167 announcements. To
increase the sample size, we gathered more announcements by including those made by MESDAQ4 (Malaysian
Exchange of Securities Dealing & Automated Quotation) firms. The total announcements made by main board,
second board and MESDAQ firms are 368. Nevertheless, only 209 are clean announcements. For robustness we also
identify the firms that make announcements more than once. From the 209 sample, 173 announcements have been
identified as the first time issuance announcements. See Table 1. Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample by
year. Year 2007 has the highest number of announcements while year 2001 has the lowest number of announcements.
Table 1: Private placement announcement sample
Description Number
Initial announcements (main board, second Board and MESDAQ) 368
Clean announcements (main board, second Board and MESDAQ) 209
Clean (first time issuance announcements) 173
Clean announcements (main board) 83
Clean announcements (second board) 84
Clean announcements (MESDAQ) 42
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The announcement effect is measured using the standard event-study methodology. Previous studies that have used
this method include Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Kato and Schallheim (1993), and Tan, Chng and Tong
(2002). To measure the abnormal returns, we estimate the market model using daily stock returns and the Kuala
Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI). In addition, for robustness we also measure the abnormal returns using the market
adjusted returns model. The abnormal return is calculated by the following equation:
ARit = Rit – E(Rit|Xt)
where ARit, Rit and E(Rit|Xt) are the abnormal, actual and normal returns for firm i on day t respectively. Xt refers to
the conditioning information for the normal return model. The equation for market model is:
Rit = αi +βiRmt + εit
where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio respectively. εit refers to the zero mean
disturbance term while αi and βi refer to the parameters of the model. The parameters of the market model (αi and βi)
are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The estimation period for the market model parameters is
140 days which starts from day -200 to day -61 before the announcement day. A long period of estimation windows
helps to remove the additional variance due to the sampling error in αi and βi (MacKinlay, 1997). The reason for using
the period prior to the event window as the estimation window is to provide unbiased parameters for the model which
are not influenced by the event.









To test the null hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) over the specified period T is equal to























































4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
On the contrary to the findings reported in other countries, the results of this study reveal zero announcement effect.
The findings are consistent with our prediction that announcements of equity private placements in Malaysia will not
have the same impact as those in the developed countries. Specifically, the announcement effect of equity private
placements on the announcement day, t = 0, is not significant. Likewise, the cumulative average abnormal returns
(CARs) around the announcement date are also not statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, the results are
inconsistent with previous studies that find positive abnormal returns following private placements announcements
(Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Hertzel and Rees, 1998; Ferreira and Brooks,
1999; Goh et al., 1999; Hertzel et al., 2002; Tan, Chng and Tong, 2002; Brooks and Graham, 2005; Cronqvist and
Nilsson, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005).
Overall, the average abnormal return (AAR) on the announcement day, t = 0 is not significant (see Table 3).
The returns on the announcement day for all the three groups (main board and second board firms; main board,
second board, and MESDAQ firms; first time announcements firms) are not statistically significantly different from
zero. On day, t=0, the returns of main board and second board firms; main board, second board, and MESDAQ firms;
first time announcements firms are 0.06 percent, 0.09 percent and 0.21 percent respectively. Table 4 presents the
AARs measured using the market adjusted returns model. Once again, the results give the same answers in term of
statistical significance. The results hold for all groups.




Main Board, Second Board
& MESDAQ
Main Board, Second Board &
MESDAQ (First Announcements)
N = 167 N = 209 N = 173
Day (t) AAR (%) p-value AAR (%) p-value AAR (%) p-value
-3 -0.09 0.16768 -0.16 0.58872 -0.25 0.44400
-2 0.13 0.15507 0.46 0.13024 0.47 0.15449
-1 0.22 0.13422 0.23 0.44981 0.06 0.85250
0 0.06 0.13083 0.09 0.77067 0.21 0.51776
1 0.02 0.13240 0.13 0.65646 0.10 0.76251
2 0.09 0.12665 -0.13 0.66877 -0.17 0.61314
3 -0.22 0.15296 0.33 0.26987 0.50 0.13230
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent level
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Table 4: Average abnormal returns (AARs) using market adjusted returns model over 7-day period
Market Adjusted Returns Model (MAR)
Main Board &
Second Board
Main Board, Second Board
& MESDAQ
Main Board, Second Board &
MESDAQ (First announcements)
N = 167 N = 209 N = 173
Day (t) AAR (%) p-value AAR (%) p-value AAR (%) p-value
-3 -0.18 0.42022 -0.29 0.15561 -0.36 0.11772
-2 0.12 0.59858 0.42 0.21331 0.48 0.22799
-1 0.26 0.37344 0.24 0.46820 0.09 0.80577
0 0.06 0.82748 0.00 0.99093 0.18 0.61775
1 -0.05 0.81823 0.13 0.58366 0.10 0.68363
2 -0.05 0.85262 -0.21 0.45113 -0.30 0.32289
3 -0.24 0.28019 0.38 0.27899 0.50 0.18688
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent l
Similar results are observed for the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement
date.  Despite the positive figures, non-statistically significant abnormal returns are found for the three-day (-1,1),
five-day (-2,2) and seven-day (-3,3) windows. See Table 5. The returns for 209 samples are 0.45 percent, 0.78
percent and 0.95 percent over the stated period respectively. Not much difference is observed when market adjusted
returns model (MAR) is used to measure the abnormal returns. The MAR employed in this study serves as a test of
the robustness for the findings found in market model (MM). Once again, the zero announcement effect holds for all
groups. See Table 5.
The insignificant returns on the announcement date might be due to the maximum number of shares imposed
to one investor. Given the fact that not more than two percent of the new equity can be placed to one investor, the
investor will not be able to influence management behavior through their voting power. As a result, instead of
enhancing monitoring, private placement may lead to managerial entrenchment. This is true especially when Malaysia
is among one of the countries in world with high concentrated ownership (Claessens et al., 2002). Fazilah (2002)
based on the ownership data as at 31st December 1998 indicates that on average, 58.8 percent of total equity in
Malaysian firms are held by the five largest shareholders. As a matter of fact, half of the companies in Malaysia are
controlled by five largest shareholders who own more than 60 percent shares. Report on the Observance of Standards
and Codes of Corporate Governance by World Bank (2005) presents further evidence on this matter. It is reported that
the case of concentrated shareholdings is very prominent in Malaysia in contrast to the case of dispersed
shareholdings which is rare. Consequently, the issuance of two percent new shares to any investors will not give any
significant impact to the firm’s value. This is because the investors will not be able to actively involved in the firm’s
affairs in general and monitoring activities in particular. Therefore, the market does not infer announcement of private
placement as good news and does not react positively to it. In other words, the changes in ownership subsequent to
private placements are so trivial and might not have any effect on the share prices. Another plausible explanation is
firms will only sell shares when they are overvalued. However, investors will only buy if they perceive the shares as
undervalued. Since private placement investors are small in number, they have the accessibility to assess the firm’s
true value. Definitely, they will only purchase undervalued or fair valued shares.  As a result, only fair valued shares
will be issued. Consequently, zero abnormal returns are realized
9
Table 5: Summary of cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) using market model and market adjusted returns model for











Event Windows -60,-5 2.80 (0.23937) 0.10 (0.96415) 1.28 (0.60608)
-3,3 0.20 (0.81123) 0.95 (0.23530) 0.93 (0.29116)
-2,2 0.51 (0.46972) 0.78 (0.24906) 0.68 (0.35851)
-1,1 0.29 (0.59267) 0.45 (0.38900) 0.38 (0.51231)
Market Adjusted Returns Model (MAR)
CAR % (p-value)
Event Windows -60,-5 2.00 (0.31448) -0.69 (0.71280) 0.21 (0.91884)
-3,3 -0.80 (0.90208) 0.67 (0.29281) 0.70 (0.32169)
-2,2 0.34 (0.50915) 0.58 (0.27875) 0.56 (0.35606)
-1,1 0.27 (0.49131) 0.37 (0.33875) 0.37 (0.39063)
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent level
No significant abnormal returns are detected for the period prior to the announcement date (refer Table 5).
The findings are inconsistent with Tan, Chng, and Tong (2002) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). Tan, Chng, and Tong
(2002) report a positive average holding period abnormal return of 8.63 percent from day -30 to day -1. Hertzel and
Smith (1993) show significant cumulative abnormal returns of 4.99 percent from day -29 to day -10. Similarly, Kato
and Schallheim (1993) report a significant run-up in the stock price prior to the announcement. Plausible explanation
for such findings is that firms time to issue seasoned equity issues after a period of share price increases. Besides that
the positive returns might be due to information leakage prior to the announcement. Since this study shows no
significant abnormal returns, the results might suggest that firms do not time equity issues in order to take advantage
of “‘windows of opportunity.” In other words, they do not time the announcements to issue overvalued equity. The
results may also be implied as there is no information leakage prior to the announcements. Consequently, there is no
evidence to conclude that abnormal returns are obtained using inside or superior information. However, for the period
of 56 days (-60,-5), the cumulative unadjusted returns are 4.68 percent which suggests that the firms do issue the
shares when the price is high.
5. CONCLUSION
This study provides further evidence concerning the announcement effect of equity private placements by examining
the market responses to equity private placements announcements in Malaysia during the period 1999 to 2007. The
results are inconsistent with observations of positive abnormal returns surrounding private placements in the other
countries such as in the United States (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Hertzel and Rees, 1998; Ferreira and
Brooks, 1999; Goh et al., 1999; Hertzel et al., 2002; Brooks and Graham, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005), Japan
(Kato and Schallheim, 1993), Singapore (Tan, Chng and Tong, 2002) and Sweden (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005).
There is also no presence of significantly positive or negative abnormal returns prior the announcement date.
Even though there is a possibility for firms to time the placement to maximize wealth as the shares cannot be sold to
directors or existing substantial shareholders, there is no evidence to support it. Thus does not support Myers and
Majluf (1984) that firms only time to issue the stocks when they are overvalued. To conclude, private placements in
Malaysia show zero announcement effect.
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